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- (자료)16일 FOMC 성명서 원문
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target for the federal funds rate at 1 percent.
The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic activity. The evidence accumulated over the intermeeting period confirms that spending is firming, although the labor market has been weakening. Business pricing power and increases in core consumer prices remain muted.
The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome fall in inflation exceeds that of a rise in inflation from its already low level. The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low remains the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; Ben S. Bernanke; Susan S. Bies; J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr.; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.; Edward M. Gramlich; Jack Guynn; Donald L. Kohn; Michael H. Moskow; Mark W. Olson; Robert T. Parry; and Jamie B. Stewart, Jr.
- (자료)그린스펀 연설 내용 원문
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] 다음은 29일 그린스펀 연준리 의장의 캔사스시티 연방준비은행 연례 경제심포지엄 개막 연설 원문이다.
Monetary Policy under Uncertainty
Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States at its core involves crucial elements of risk management, a process that requires an understanding of the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face and the quantifying of those risks when possible. It also entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goal of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it.
Toward that objective, we have drawn on the work of analysts who over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism. A critical result has been the identification of a relatively small set of key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approximation of our economy"s dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the likely influence of our policy decisions.
Despite the extensive efforts to capture and quantify these key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the important linkages is far from complete and in all likelihood will always remain so. Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed conceptually and empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, even with large advances in computational capabilities and greater comprehension of economic linkages, our knowledge base is barely able to keep pace with the ever-increasing complexity of our global economy.
Given this state of flux, it is apparent that a prominent shortcoming of our structural models is that, for ease in parameter estimation, not only are economic responses presumed fixed through time, but they are generally assumed to be linear. An assumption of linearity may be adequate for estimating average relationships, but few expect that an economy will respond linearly to every aberration. Although some nonlinearities are accounted for in our modeling exercises, we cannot be certain that our simulations provide reasonable approximations of the economy"s behavior in times of large idiosyncratic shocks.
Recent history has also reinforced the perception that the relationships underlying the economy"s structure change over time in ways that are difficult to anticipate. This has been most apparent in the changing role of our standard measure of the money stock. Because an interest rate, by definition, is the exchange rate for money against non-monies, money obviously is central to monetary policy. However, in the past two decades, what constitutes money has been obscured by the introduction of technologies that have facilitated the proliferation of financial products and have altered the empirical relationship between economic activity and what we define as money, and in doing so has inhibited the keying of monetary policy to the control of the measured money stock.1
Another example of ongoing structural change relates to innovations in mortgage finance. This includes the elimination of Regulation Q, the emergence of variable rate loans, the growth of the mortgage-backed securities market, and improvements in the efficiency of the credit application process. These developments appear to have buffered activity in the housing market to some extent from shifts in monetary policy. But some of the same innovations in housing finance have opened new avenues of policy influence on economic behavior. For example, households have been able with increasing ease to extract equity from their homes, and this doubtless has helped support consumer spending in recent years, complementing the traditional effects of monetary policy.
* * *
What then are the implications of this largely irreducible uncertainty for the conduct of monetary policy? A well-known proposition is that, under a very restrictive set of assumptions, uncertainty has no bearing on the actions that policymakers might choose, and so they should proceed as if they know the precise structure of the economy.2 These assumptions--linearity in the structure of the economy, perfect knowledge of the interest-sensitivity of aggregate spending and other so-called slope parameters, and a very specific attitude of policymakers toward risk--are never met in the real world.
Indeed, given our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of our ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank seeking to maximize its probability of achieving its goals is driven, I believe, to a risk-management approach to policy. By this I mean that policymakers need to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. They then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy.
A policy action that is calculated to be optimal based on a simulation of one particular model may not, in fact, be optimal once the full extent of uncertainty in the policymaking environment is taken into account. In general, it is entirely possible that different policies will exhibit different degrees of robustness with respect to the true underlying structure of the economy. For example, policy A might be judged as best advancing the policymakers" objectives, conditional on a particular model of the economy, but might also be seen as having relatively severe adverse consequences if the true structure of the economy turns out to be other than the one assumed. On the other hand, policy B might be somewhat less effective in advancing the policy objectives under the assumed baseline model but might be relatively benign in the event that the structure of the economy turns out to differ from the baseline. These considerations have inclined Federal Reserve policymakers toward policies that limit the risk of deflation even though the baseline forecasts from most conventional models would not project such an event.
* * *
At times, policy practitioners operating under a risk-management paradigm may be led to undertake actions intended to provide some insurance against the emergence of especially adverse outcomes. For example, following the Russian debt default in the fall of 1998, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) eased policy despite our perception that the economy was expanding at a satisfactory pace and that, even without a policy initiative, was likely to continue to do so.3 We eased policy because we were concerned about the low-probability risk that the default might severely disrupt domestic and international financial markets, with outsized adverse feedback to the performance of the U.S. economy.
The product of a low-probability event and a severe outcome, should it occur, was judged a larger threat than the possible adverse consequences of insurance that might prove unnecessary. The cost--or premium--of the financial-contagion insurance was the associated increase in the risk of higher inflation at some future date. This cost was viewed as relatively low at the time, largely because increased competition, driven by globalization, thwarted employers" ability to pass through higher labor costs into prices. Given the Russian default, the benefits of the unusual policy action were deemed to outweigh its costs.
Such a cost-benefit analysis is an ongoing part of monetary policy decisionmaking, and tips more toward monetary ease when the fallout from a contractionary event such as the Russian default seems increasingly likely and its occurrence seems especially costly. Conversely, in 1979, with inflation threatening to get out of control, the cost to the economy of a major withdrawal of liquidity was judged far less than the potential long-term consequences of leaving accelerating prices unaddressed.
* * *
In implementing a risk-management approach to policy, we must confront the fact that only a limited number of risks can be quantified with any confidence. And even these risks are generally quantifiable only if we accept the assumption that the future will replicate the past. Other risks are essentially unquantifiable--representing Knightian uncertainty, if you will--because we may not fully appreciate even the full range of possibilities, let alone each possibility"s likelihood. As a result, risk management often involves significant judgment on the part of policymakers, as we evaluate the risks of different events and the probability that our actions will alter those risks.
For such judgment, we policymakers, rather than relying solely on the specific linkages expressed in our formal models, have tended to draw from broader, though less mathematically precise, hypotheses of how the world works. For example, inference of how market participants might respond to a monetary policy initiative may need to reference past behavior during a period only roughly comparable to the current situation.
Some critics have argued that such an approach to policy is too undisciplined--judgmental, seemingly discretionary, and difficult to explain. The Federal Reserve should, some conclude, attempt to be more formal in its operations by tying its actions solely to the prescriptions of a formal policy rule. That any approach along these lines would lead to an improvement in economic performance, however, is highly doubtful. Our problem is not the complexity of our models but the far greater complexity of a world economy whose underlying linkages appear to be in a continual state of flux.
Rules by their nature are simple, and when significant and shifting uncertainties exist in the economic environment, they cannot substitute for risk-management paradigms, which are far better suited to policymaking. Were we to introduce an interest rate rule, how would we judge the meaning of a rule that posits a rate far above or below the current rate? Should policymakers adjust the current rate to that suggested by the rule? Should we conclude that this deviation is normal variance and disregard the signal? Or should we assume that the parameters of the rule are misspecified and adjust them to fit the current rate? Given errors in our underlying data, coupled with normal variance, we might not know the correct course of action for a considerable time. Partly for these reasons, the prescriptions of formal interest rate rules are best viewed only as helpful adjuncts to policy, as indeed many proponents of policy rules have suggested.
* * *
In summary then, monetary policy based on risk management appears to be the most useful regime by which to conduct policy. The increasingly intricate economic and financial linkages in our global economy, in my judgment, compel such a conclusion. Over the next couple of days, we will have the opportunity to consider in greater detail some important changes in our economic and financial systems and their implications for the conduct of monetary policy. As always, I look forward to an engaging discussion.
*Footnotes
1. Nonetheless, in the tradition of Milton Friedman, it is difficult to disregard the long-run relationship between money and prices. In particular, since 1959 unit money supply, the ratio of M2 to real GDP, has increased at an annual rate of 3.7 percent and GDP prices have risen 3.8 percent per year. (A consistent time-series for M2 is available back to 1959. Among other changes, deposit data at a daily frequency were incorporated in measures of the monetary aggregates as of that date.) Return to text
2. William Brainard, "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, May 1967, pp. 411-25. Return to text
3. See minutes of the FOMC meeting of September 29, 1998. Return to text
- (채권전략)이코노미스트의 변심은 유죄(?)
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] 한국은행이 경제 전망을 너무 자주 바꾼다고 기자들이 힐난하자, 전철환 전 한국은행 총재는 "예측하는 사람은 불행하다"는 명언을 남겼다.
요즘 월가에는 변심한 이코노미스트들 천지다. 이들은 앞다퉈 미국의 올해 GDP 전망치를 상향 조정하고 있다. 얼마전까지만해도 "2% 성장조차 어림없다"던 이코노미스트들이 4~5%를 떠들고 다닌다.(이 기사는 8월28일 14시29분 edaily의 유료 금융시장 뉴스인 `마켓플러스`를 통해 출고됐습니다)
전 총재의 말대로 이들 이코노미스트는 불행한 사람들이다. 예측이 맞으면 `용하다`고 신기하게 바라보지만, 사람이 어떻게 앞날을 100% 맞추겠는가.
이코노미스트의 일은 그때그때 수많은 경제지표를 분석, GDP 전망치를 올리거나, 내리면서 전망치를 최종 결과치에 근접시키는 것이다. 이런 실상을 모르는 사람들은 "이코노미스트들은 지조가 없다, 결과를 꿰어 맞춘다"며 조롱한다.
여기 월가에서 가장 유명한 `불행한 이코노미스트`, 스티븐 로치가 있다.
모건스탠리의 글로벌 이코노믹스 팀을 이끌고 있는 로치는 이 주 초 올해의 세계 경제성장률 전망치를 2.6%에서 2.8%로 상향 조정했다. 2주 동안 휴가를 다녀온 후 나온 그의 첫 보고서였다.
변심한 이코노미스트 대열에 합류한 것이다. 내년도 세계 성장률은 3.8%로 그대로 뒀다.
로치 당신마저...그러나 그의 리포트를 자세히 읽어보니, 아직 완전한 변심은 아니었다. 전망치를 올렸지만, 자신이 아직도 경제를 비관적으로 보는 이유를 설명하는데 더 많은 부문을 할애했다.
로치가 세계 경제 성장률을 높인 이유는 일본 때문이다. 일본의 올해 성장률 전망치가 1.4%에서 2.0%로 올라가면서 전체적인 조정이 필요했던 것.
그는 일본의 2% 성장을 절대로 높은 것이 아니라고 강조한다. 그는 "상향 조정된 성장률 전망치는 왕성한 회복이라고 보기 어렵다(This upwardly revised global growth forecast hardly paints a picture of vigorous recovery.)"고 썼다.
회복이 된다지만 무기력한 성장(anemic recovery)이라는 것. 로치는 글로벌 이코노미의 동시다발적인 회복이 어려운 이유로 3가지 제시했다.
3가지 이유는 로치의 특허인 더블딥, 불균형론 그대로였다. 첫째 글로벌 이코노미의 성장 동력인 미국 경제는 아직도 90년대 버블의 찌꺼기를 청소하지 못했다는 것.
둘째, 글로벌 링키지(Global Linkage)에 묶여 유럽, 일본, 아시아 경제가 내수 확장과 같은 자생력을 잃었다는 것.
셋째, 미국의 막대한 재정적자와 같은 불균형이 쉽게 해결되지 않고 있다는 것이다. 그러면 그렇지, 로치는 지조를 지키며 비관론자의 길을 고집하고 있었다.
이코노미스트에게는 `변심`의 특권이 있다. 그 특권 때문에 조롱 당하고, 불행할 수 있지만 전망치를 유연하게 수정하는 것은 이코노미스트의 권리이자 의무다.
로치가 성장률 전망치를 높이고도 `자신의 생각`을 고치지 않는 것은 더 큰 불행을 자초하는 것일지도 모른다.
그 자신 이렇게 고백하고 있다. "`터닝 포인트다`라고 외치는 것은 예측하는 사람에게 있어 가장 무시무시한 도전이다.(Calling turning points is always the most formidable challenge for any forecaster.)
분석자가 지금까지 가지고 있던 분석의 틀이 자각능력을 마비시킴으로써 그같은 도전은 더욱 어렵게 된다. 그 틀 자체가 세상을 다르게 볼 수 없도록 만들 수도 있다.(That challenge often gets complicated by the self-perceived rigor of the forecaster"s analytical framework -- those proverbial inted glasses that all too often make it hard to see the world differently.)
나역시 한동안 미국 중심주의의 불균형을 강조하는 분석의 틀에 오랫동안 갇혀 있었다.(I certainly confess to such biases -- having been wedded for some time to a framework that stresses the persistent imbalances of a US-centric world.)"
더블 딥으로 유명세를 탄 이코노미스트가 "지금부터 생각이 달라졌다. 경제가 회복된다"고 말을 바꾼다는 것이 얼마나 어렵겠는가. 수년간 가지고 있던 분석의 틀을 한순간 폐기처분할 수 있겠는가.
로치도 자신의 함정이 무엇인지 알고 냉정하게 이것을 돌아보는 시간을 가졌던 것 같다.(Fortunately, I have had the benefit of two weeks of mindless holiday that enable me to be a bit more open minded in coming up with a fresh perspective on the global outlook. And so in the spirit of thinking outside of my own box, allow me to probe the possibility of a synchronous recovery in the global economy.)
그러나 결론은 변하지 않았다. 로치는 도저히 `변심`할 수 없었던 모양이다. 자신의 생각을 바꿀만한 증거를 찾지 못했거나, 애써 외면했는지도 모르겠다.
로치는 솔직히 자신이 틀릴 수도 있다는 것을 암시한다. 그는 전형적인 경제성장에는 회의적이지만, 일시적인 가속 성장은 가능할 것이라고 시인했다.(As a card-carrying growth skeptic, even I concede that bouts of temporary acceleration are possible.)
로치는 "지난 4년간 글로벌 이코노미를 놓고 논쟁을 벌이면서, 언젠가 세계 경제가 안정적이고, 활기찬 모습을 보일 날이 있을 것이라고 생각해왔다"고 말했다.
로치는 "그러나 아직은 아니다"라며 리포트를 끝마쳤다. 그가 `아니다`라고 했지만 세상은 벌써 바뀌었는지도 모른다. 이코노미스트의 변심은 유죄가 아니다. 그렇다면 변심을 잘 못하는 이코노미스트는 유죄인가, 무죄인가.
- (채권전략)이코노미스트의 변심은 유죄(?)
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] 한국은행이 경제 전망을 너무 자주 바꾼다고 기자들이 힐난하자, 전철환 전 한국은행 총재는 "예측하는 사람은 불행하다"는 명언을 남겼다.
요즘 월가에는 변심한 이코노미스트들 천지다. 이들은 앞다퉈 미국의 올해 GDP 전망치를 상향 조정하고 있다. 얼마전까지만해도 "2% 성장조차 어림없다"던 이코노미스트들이 4~5%를 떠들고 다닌다.
전 총재의 말대로 이들 이코노미스트는 불행한 사람들이다. 예측이 맞으면 `용하다`고 신기하게 바라보지만, 사람이 어떻게 앞날을 100% 맞추겠는가.
이코노미스트의 일은 그때그때 수많은 경제지표를 분석, GDP 전망치를 올리거나, 내리면서 전망치를 최종 결과치에 근접시키는 것이다. 이런 실상을 모르는 사람들은 "이코노미스트들은 지조가 없다, 결과를 꿰어 맞춘다"며 조롱한다.
여기 월가에서 가장 유명한 `불행한 이코노미스트`, 스티븐 로치가 있다.
모건스탠리의 글로벌 이코노믹스 팀을 이끌고 있는 로치는 이 주 초 올해의 세계 경제성장률 전망치를 2.6%에서 2.8%로 상향 조정했다. 2주 동안 휴가를 다녀온 후 나온 그의 첫 보고서였다.
변심한 이코노미스트 대열에 합류한 것이다. 내년도 세계 성장률은 3.8%로 그대로 뒀다.
로치 당신마저...그러나 그의 리포트를 자세히 읽어보니, 아직 완전한 변심은 아니었다. 전망치를 올렸지만, 자신이 아직도 경제를 비관적으로 보는 이유를 설명하는데 더 많은 부문을 할애했다.
로치가 세계 경제 성장률을 높인 이유는 일본 때문이다. 일본의 올해 성장률 전망치가 1.4%에서 2.0%로 올라가면서 전체적인 조정이 필요했던 것.
그는 일본의 2% 성장을 절대로 높은 것이 아니라고 강조한다. 그는 "상향 조정된 성장률 전망치는 왕성한 회복이라고 보기 어렵다(This upwardly revised global growth forecast hardly paints a picture of vigorous recovery.)"고 썼다.
회복이 된다지만 무기력한 성장(anemic recovery)이라는 것. 로치는 글로벌 이코노미의 동시다발적인 회복이 어려운 이유로 3가지 제시했다.
3가지 이유는 로치의 특허인 더블딥, 불균형론 그대로였다. 첫째 글로벌 이코노미의 성장 동력인 미국 경제는 아직도 90년대 버블의 찌꺼기를 청소하지 못했다는 것.
둘째, 글로벌 링키지(Global Linkage)에 묶여 유럽, 일본, 아시아 경제가 내수 확장과 같은 자생력을 잃었다는 것.
셋째, 미국의 막대한 재정적자와 같은 불균형이 쉽게 해결되지 않고 있다는 것이다. 그러면 그렇지, 로치는 지조를 지키며 비관론자의 길을 고집하고 있었다.
이코노미스트에게는 `변심`의 특권이 있다. 그 특권 때문에 조롱 당하고, 불행할 수 있지만 전망치를 유연하게 수정하는 것은 이코노미스트의 권리이자 의무다.
로치가 성장률 전망치를 높이고도 `자신의 생각`을 고치지 않는 것은 더 큰 불행을 자초하는 것일지도 모른다.
그 자신 이렇게 고백하고 있다. "`터닝 포인트다`라고 외치는 것은 예측하는 사람에게 있어 가장 무시무시한 도전이다.(Calling turning points is always the most formidable challenge for any forecaster.)
분석자가 지금까지 가지고 있던 분석의 틀이 자각능력을 마비시킴으로써 그같은 도전은 더욱 어렵게 된다. 그 틀 자체가 세상을 다르게 볼 수 없도록 만들 수도 있다.(That challenge often gets complicated by the self-perceived rigor of the forecaster"s analytical framework -- those proverbial inted glasses that all too often make it hard to see the world differently.)
나역시 한동안 미국 중심주의의 불균형을 강조하는 분석의 틀에 오랫동안 갇혀 있었다.(I certainly confess to such biases -- having been wedded for some time to a framework that stresses the persistent imbalances of a US-centric world.)"
더블 딥으로 유명세를 탄 이코노미스트가 "지금부터 생각이 달라졌다. 경제가 회복된다"고 말을 바꾼다는 것이 얼마나 어렵겠는가. 수년간 가지고 있던 분석의 틀을 한순간 폐기처분할 수 있겠는가.
로치도 자신의 함정이 무엇인지 알고 냉정하게 이것을 돌아보는 시간을 가졌던 것 같다.(Fortunately, I have had the benefit of two weeks of mindless holiday that enable me to be a bit more open minded in coming up with a fresh perspective on the global outlook. And so in the spirit of thinking outside of my own box, allow me to probe the possibility of a synchronous recovery in the global economy.)
그러나 결론은 변하지 않았다. 로치는 도저히 `변심`할 수 없었던 모양이다. 자신의 생각을 바꿀만한 증거를 찾지 못했거나, 애써 외면했는지도 모르겠다.
로치는 솔직히 자신이 틀릴 수도 있다는 것을 암시한다. 그는 전형적인 경제성장에는 회의적이지만, 일시적인 가속 성장은 가능할 것이라고 시인했다.(As a card-carrying growth skeptic, even I concede that bouts of temporary acceleration are possible.)
로치는 "지난 4년간 글로벌 이코노미를 놓고 논쟁을 벌이면서, 언젠가 세계 경제가 안정적이고, 활기찬 모습을 보일 날이 있을 것이라고 생각해왔다"고 말했다.
로치는 "그러나 아직은 아니다"라며 리포트를 끝마쳤다. 그가 `아니다`라고 했지만 세상은 벌써 바뀌었는지도 모른다.
이코노미스트의 변심은 유죄가 아니다. 그렇다면 변심을 잘 못하는 이코노미스트는 유죄인가, 무죄인가.
- "관료,기자에 정기적으로 돈봉투"-국정홍보 차장
- [edaily 국제부] 국정홍보처 정순균 차장은 아시안월스트리트저널(AWSJ) 온라인판 22일자 기고문을 통해 "노무현 대통령의 언론소송은 정부와 언론의 오랜 유착관행을 바로잡고 투명한 관계를 설정해야 한다는 절실한 필요에서 비롯된 것"이라고 주장했다.
정 차장은 이 글에서 많은 한국 기자들이 중요한 사실관계를 제대로 확인하지 않고 기사를 작성하곤 함으로써 개인의 명예와 사생활을 훼손하고 사업상의 피해를 입힌다고 밝혔다.
또 정부 관료들이 각 부처별로 영향력이 있다고 여겨지는 기자들에게 술과 식사를 대접하고 정기적으로 돈봉투를 건넸다고 소개했다.
정 차장은 정부의 소송 제기가 이같은 관행을 바로잡는 동시에 악의적으로 날조된 기사에 대응하기 위한 "대담한 개혁조치"의 일부이며 몇몇 언론과 학자들이 이를 언론탄압으로 과장하고 있다고 역설했다.
정 차장의 이번 기고는 18일자 아시안월스트리트저널에 실린 "노무현 대통령과 언론"이라는 제목의 사설에 대한 반박문 형식으로 게재된 것이다. 당시 아시안월스트리트저널은 노무현 대통령의 언론사에 대한 손해배상 청구소송이 언론의 자유를 제한할 수 있다는 우려를 표시했었다.
다음은 AWSJ에 실린 기고문 원문.
Standing Up to the Press in Korea
I refer to your Aug. 18 editorial, "President Roh vs. the Press," and wish to address why the Korean government is waging war against the misguided practices of the press and President Roh Moo Hyun has filed a libel suit against some newspapers.
The government action was necessitated by the dire need to correct the long-standing collusion between the government and the press and to set up new transparent relations. President Roh defines it as "healthy relations of tension" vis-a-vis the press.
Many Korean reporters tend to file a report without first checking and confirming important points, resulting in damaged personal reputations, infringement of privacy and business losses. This is evidenced by the fact that 80% of the government"s request for correction or rebuttals were found to be valid during the past five months.
Many government officers used to subscribe to the early-morning issues of daily newspapers to see if there were any unfavorable stories, so that they could call the editors before the main issue came out. The officials curried various favors with the media, maintained a select group of supposedly influential reporters at each government agency, wined and dined them, and regularly handed them envelopes of cash.
In order to rectify these wrong practices as well as establish a new wholesome relationship between the government and the press, the Roh Moo Hyun administration is launching a set of bold reforms. One measure was to disband the exclusive group of reporters assigned to Cheong Wa Dae -- the office of the president -- and various government ministries and agencies and institute a regular briefing system, open to all media representatives. Other actions involved banning government agencies from subscribing to early morning editions of daily newspapers and prohibiting bureaucrats from making improper contacts with reporters. On the other hand, the government is providing sufficient access to news sources. The policy of the incumbent administration is to respond boldly and in a lawful manner to obviously erroneous articles as well as malicious and concocted reports. Some media and journalism scholars allege that this represents oppression of the press. But I have to make clear that the government has never lost faith in freedom of the press.
In the sense that freedom of expression, especially criticism against a government, constitutes the essence of freedom of the press, that very freedom is blossoming under the current administration more so than under any previous administration or even anywhere in the world. The government"s responses to incorrect reports are being made openly, in accordance with the constitution and law.
It is time the old abuses by the Korean press, including misguided concoction of facts and incorrect reporting, are stopped once and for all. All the Korean administration asks of the press is that it files reports on the basis of truthful and correct information. This is not asking too much of a responsible media.
Jung Soon-kyun
Vice Minister
Government Information Agency
Republic of Korea
- (채권전략)욕심과 공포, 그리고 `되돌림`
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] 19일 월가에서는 모건스탠리의 스티브 갈브레이스가 여기저기서 회자됐다. 포트폴리오 전략가로서 명성이 높은 그가 채권 투자비중을 5%포인트 높였기 때문.
그가 쓴 보고서는 두 페이지 정도로 내용 자체는 특별한 것이 없었다. 갈브레이스의 모델 포트폴리오라는 것도 주식, 채권, 현금으로 크게 잘라 놓은 것이 전부였다.
최초 그의 포트폴리오는 주식 70%, 채권 25%, 현금 5%였다. 그러나 주식과 채권가격이 동시에 오르자 2개월 전 포트폴리오는 주식 65%, 채권 20%, 현금 15%로 바뀌었다. 이것을 이번에 주식 65%, 채권 25%, 현금 10%으로 조정한 것이다.
갈브레이스가 생각하는 중립적 포트폴리오는 주식 65%, 채권 30%, 현금 5%다. 왜 이것이 중립적인지는 리포트에 나와 있지 않다.(다른 리포트에 자세하게 설명을 했는지는 모르겠다.)
조정된 포트폴리오와 중립적 포트폴리오를 비교해보면 채권은 여전히 `언더웨이트(underweight)`이고 주식은 `뉴트럴(neutral)`이다.
갈브레이스는 주가는 적정가격에 근접했고, 채권은 아직도 비싼 것으로 평가하고 있는 것이다. 채권이 여전히 비싸지만 이번에 비중을 높인 것은 최근 금리 급등을 `전략적으로` 무시할 수 없었기 때문이다.
지난 6월에 장기국채를 사서 10년 동안 투자했다고 가정하고 그 수익률을 연율로 환산해보면 직전월보다 무려 100bp가 떨어졌다는 것.
한마디로 채권의 절대금리가 급등하면서 채권의 투자 상대적으로 매력이 높아졌다는 뜻이다.
갈브레이스는 그러나 주식 투자 수익률이 채권보다 높을 것이라는 생각은 바뀌지 않았다고 밝혔다. 지난 10년간의 채권투자 수익률이 `장기적`인 평균 수익률보다 50% 이상 높다는 것이 그 이유다.
갈브레이스는 주식시장이 지난 3년간의 베어마켓에서 벗어나는 것처럼 채권 투자 수익률이 결국은 `평균 수준`으로 되돌아갈 것이라고 말한다.
그가 주식과 채권의 적정 가격, 장기 투자시 평균치를 산정한 기준은 아래와 같다. 이 그래프가 만들어진 정량적 설명은 리포트에 나와 있지 않았다.
"투자 수익률이 결국은 평균으로 돌아간다"는 입장에서 보면 지금 이 순간 채권은 고평가된 것이고, 주식은 적정 수준에 도달한 것이다. 여기까지 그가 포트폴리오를 조정한 이유는 평범한 것이었다. 자신이 만든 모델에 따라 비싼 것은 비중을 줄이고, 싼 것은 비중을 늘리는 전형적인 포트폴리오 전략이다.
갈브레이스 리포트의 백미는 마지막 부분에 있었다.
"금융 자산이 `평균으로 되돌아가는 성질이 있다`는 매우 강력한 역사적 증거에도 불구하고, 투자자들은 평균 레벨에 머물러 있는 것을 꺼려한다.(While financial assets have a very strong history of mean reverting, they rarely seem to stay at mean levels.)
이런 의미에서 장기채 수익률의 급등은 전혀 놀랍지 않다. 금리 급등을 오버슈팅이라고 볼 수도 없다.(In this sense, the stunning increase in long-term Treasury yields is not that surprising. Neither would an overshoot be.)
우리는 어떤 경우든 매도하려는 사람의 욕심과 매수하려는 사람의 공포 사이에 있다.(In any instance, we remain sellers of greed and buyers of fear.)"
두달전 채권수익률이 역사적 저점에 왔을 때 많은 사람들이 "금리가 더 떨어지기는 어렵겠지"라고 생각하면서도 `매도자의 욕심`은 듀레이션 축소를 어렵게 했다.
마찬가지로 금리가 단숨에 130bp나 오른 상황에서 `매수자의 공포`는 채권 비중을 다시 늘리는 것을 주저하게 만든다.
갈브레이스는 지난해 머니마켓 매니저들이 뽑은 최우수 포트폴리오 전략가라고 한다. 그는 시장의 심리를 극적으로 읽어낼 줄 알았기 때문에 상을 받은 것같다.
- 연준리, `주식과 채권` 사이..중립선언
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] 연방준비제도이사회(FRB)가 주식 투자자들을 실망시키지 않으면서 채권시장에도 쇼크를 주지 않아야하는 어려운 여름방학 숙제를 `심플`하게 처리했다. 지난번 숙제를 그대로 옮겨 제출한 것.
12일 공개시장위원회(FOMC) 회의 직후 발표한 성명서는 지난 6월 25bp(0.25%포인트) 금리를 내릴 당시와 상당히 유사하다. "명확한 언어로 정책 스탠스를 설명하라"는 시장의 요구를 이전 성명서에 썼던 용어를 반복 사용함으로써 피해나간 것이다.
FOMC 발표문은 6개 항목으로 요약할 수 있다. 첫째, 경제 활동을 지원하는 순응적(accommodative) 통화정책을 유지한다.(The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still-robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic activity.)
둘째, 6월이후 노동지표의 혼재 상황에도 불구하고 지출이 탄탄해졌다.(The evidence accumulated over the intermeeting period shows that spending is firming, although labor market indicators are mixed.)
셋째, 기업들의 프라이상 파워와 코아 인플레이션의 증가는 정체 상태다.(Business pricing power and increases in core consumer prices remain muted.)
넷째, 경기 상승과 하강 위험은 같지만, 바람직하지 않은 인플레이션의 하락 가능성이 인플레이션 가능성보다 높다.(The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome fall in inflation exceeds that of a rise in inflation from its already low level.)
다섯째, 바람직하지 않은 인플레의 하락 가능성에 대해 우려한다.(The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future.)
결론적으로 순응적인 통화정책을 상당 기간 유지한다.(In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.)
FOMC 발표문은 첫째, 둘째, 셋째 항목이 한 문단으로 묶여있고, 이후 넷째부터 여섯째 항목이 또 다른 문단을 이룬다.
첫째 항목은 연준리의 정책 스탠스를 선언한 것인데 지난 6월 발표문과 같다. 금리를 동결했지만 정책 스탠스가 같다는 의미다.
둘째, 셋째 항목은 경기 상황에 대한 연준리의 인식이다. 연준리는 노동시장과 물가 문제만 언급했다. 6월 발표문에는 금융시장 환경이 같이 언급돼 있었다. 노동시장 지표가 아직도 혼재돼 있다고 표현함으로써 고용 문제가 여전히 연준리의 초점임을 강조했다.
두번째 문단에서 "바람직하지 않은 인플레이션의 하락"은 디플레이션을 의미하는 것이지만, 이번에도 연준리는 `디플레이션`이라는 용어를 쓰지 않았다. 넷째, 다섯째 항목은 6월 발표문과 거의 유사하다. 경기 하강 가능성과 상승 가능성이 같다는 표현도 유사하다.
연준리가 디플레이션에 대해 우려하고 있다는 것을 같은 단어와 비슷한 문장으로 강조한 셈이다.
6월 발표문과 다른 것은 순응적 통화정책을 한동안 유지한다는 마지막 여섯째 문장이다. 이는 그린스펀이 의회 청문회에서 수차례 직접 말한 것을 명문화한 것이다.
주식시장은 두번째 문장과 마지막 문장을 읽고 만족감을 표시했다. 연준리가 노동시장에 대해 여전히 관심을 가지고 있고, 지출(spendig)이라고 표한한 `경기 회복`에 무게를 뒀다고 생각한 것. 순응적 통화정책은 혹시 모를 디플레 방지책으로 일종의 보험인 셈이다.
채권시장은 100% 만족한 것은 아니지만 마지막 문장에서 위안을 찾을 수밖에 없다. 채권 투자자들은 그린스펀이 의회 청문회에서 "조심스러운 낙관론"을 표명한 이후, 더 이상의 금리인하가 어렵다는 것을 받아들였다. 채권시장은 대신 "당장 금리를 인상하는 것은 아니다"는 말을 분명하게 듣고 싶어했다.
채권시장은 "저금리 정책을 한동안 유지한다"는 말을 `글`로 확인함으로써 투자심리를 추스를 수 있게 됐다.
- (자료)FOMC 발표문 원문
- [뉴욕=edaily 정명수특파원] The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target for the federal funds rate at 1 percent.
The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still-robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic activity. The evidence accumulated over the intermeeting period shows that spending is firming, although labor market indicators are mixed. Business pricing power and increases in core consumer prices remain muted.
The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome fall in inflation exceeds that of a rise in inflation from its already low level. The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; Ben S. Bernanke; Susan S. Bies; J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr.; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.; Edward M. Gramlich; Jack Guynn; Donald L. Kohn; Michael H. Moskow; Mark W. Olson; Robert T. Parry; and Jamie B. Stewart, Jr.
- 미 연방준비제도이사회 베이지북(원문)
- [뉴욕=edaily 이의철특파원] 다음은 30일 발표된 미 FRB의 베이지북 요약본 원문.
Prepared at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and based on information collected before July 21, 2003. This document summarizes comments received from business and other contacts outside the Federal Reserve and is not a commentary on the views of Federal Reserve officials.
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Reports from the twelve Federal Reserve districts provided additional signs that the pace of economic activity increased a notch during June and the first half of July. Only the Chicago, St. Louis, and San Francisco districts characterized economic activity as sluggish while Atlanta described conditions as mixed. Reports from the remaining districts suggested somewhat stronger growth in the weeks since the last Beige Book. Consistent with the generally more positive assessments of current economic activity, several districts noted increased optimism about economic prospects in coming months.
In particular, manufacturing activity edged higher in most districts, and Philadelphia and Richmond cited an end to the recent declines in production. The districts" reports also suggested that activity in the services and energy sectors grew somewhat faster in recent weeks. In contrast, consumer spending remained lackluster-only New York reported a noticeable improvement in retail sales. Housing sales and starts remained strong across districts, spurred by low mortgage interest rates, but commercial real estate conditions remained sluggish. Prices were generally little changed, though higher health insurance costs continued to be passed on to employees according to some districts. In agriculture, excessive rainfall delayed harvesting and damaged crops in several districts but was credited with alleviating drought conditions in other districts.
Consumer Spending and Tourism
Retail sales were mixed across districts since the last Beige Book report. Sales improved noticeably in the New York District, while sales in the Atlanta, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia districts, sales posted slight to modest gains. In contrast, sales revenues were said to be flat in the San Francisco District, lackluster in the Chicago District, and below year-ago levels in the St. Louis District. Among categories, apparel sales were weak in the Boston, Cleveland, and Philadelphia districts, but were higher in the New York and Richmond districts. Richmond also reported stronger sales of home merchandise, hardware, and building supplies. In the Chicago and Philadelphia districts, customers were said to be buying less expensive brands of merchandise. Retailers in the Atlanta, Dallas, New York, and San Francisco districts cited heavy discounting and noted that retail prices remained competitive. Retail inventories in the Atlanta District were described as low and balanced, but in the Dallas and St. Louis districts, some retailers reported excess inventories.
Reports on automobile sales across the districts were mixed. Sales were flat to lower in the Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, St. Louis, and San Francisco districts. Sales were steady in Philadelphia and Richmond, but were mixed in Atlanta. In the Kansas City District, motor vehicle sales improved in areas outside of Colorado, and Minneapolis reported that automobile sales were above year-ago levels. Contacts in several districts said new vehicle inventories were above desired levels. Dealers in the Kansas City District reported record-high inventories, but they expected the inventories would be drawn down in coming weeks.
Tourism and travel reports were also mixed in June and the first half of July. In the Chicago District, hotel occupancy rates were boosted by discounts and economy packages. Boston said that international travel more than doubled compared to last year, but the report indicated that travel industry expectations were not met because activity still trailed pre-9/11 levels. Likewise, early summer travel in the Atlanta District fell short of industry expectations even though a large cruise line in South Florida reported a recent spike in bookings and projected a robust second half. Kansas City indicated that passenger traffic rose at most airports in its District and that convention business in Denver was strong.
Manufacturing
Nascent signs of a recovery emerged in the manufacturing sector with 10 of the 12 district reports indicating mixed, steady or slightly improved conditions after an extended period of declines. Atlanta and St. Louis suggested continued softness in the sector, with both reports citing increasing plant closings and layoffs. Reinforcing the view of stronger conditions in manufacturing, nine of the twelve districts were optimistic about prospects for the sector over the next six months. Despite the stronger tone, prices of manufactured products remained soft.
Chicago"s report noted that nationwide light vehicle production was "pretty good" through mid-July and that heavy equipment orders edged up, in part because of a weaker dollar. San Francisco reported that new orders in the information technology sector strengthened, reducing inventory levels. Suppliers to the defense and military industry in the Cleveland and Atlanta districts continued to report strong orders, while Boston and Dallas noted a pickup in demand for personal computers and computer hardware. Philadelphia added that demand increased for residential construction materials and orders rose for printing and industrial machinery components.
But weakness persisted in some segments of the manufacturing sector. Richmond and Atlanta reported that textile shipments continued to fall, Atlanta reported layoffs at an aircraft engine plant, and Boston noted weakness in the aerospace industry. Cleveland indicated that auto production fell further though the decline was smaller than in previous months. Chicago said that demand for steel remained soft and Dallas reported that energy-related manufacturing activity was softer.
On balance, capital expenditures in the manufacturing sector remained weak, although several districts reported an increase in investment planned for the future. Atlanta reported that firms remained reluctant to buy new equipment. Kansas City indicated that recent capital spending fell but that planned future investment edged up, as optimism about manufacturing prospects remained high. Boston and Dallas noted increases in capital spending for upgrades in hardware and software, while Philadelphia said that manufacturers planned to increase investment, though some firms indicated they would likely delay expansion until next year. St. Louis reported that several plants in that district have recently announced plans to expand.
Services
Ten districts reported increased demand in the service sector during recent weeks. Demand for legal services increased in the Dallas, New York, and San Francisco districts, and Philadelphia said demand for technological expertise and business consulting rose. In the San Francisco District, contacts reported stronger demand for high-tech and real estate services. Atlanta, Boston, and New York reported a pickup in the demand for finance and insurance services and the Dallas report suggested stronger corporate finance and acquisitions activity.
Construction and Real Estate
Residential real estate activity remained strong in most districts in June and early July. Atlanta, Kansas City, and St. Louis said housing sales continued to rise while Boston, Cleveland, and Richmond reported that sales remained strong. Chicago indicated that overall sales activity was mixed. In contrast, Dallas indicated that the housing market remained weak. In terms of price levels, lower-priced homes continued to be the best sellers in the Boston, Dallas, and Richmond districts and sales of upper-price range homes held up in the Boston and New York districts. Richmond reported that home prices soared in Maryland in recent months and San Francisco said prices rose rapidly in Hawaii and southern California. However, home price increases moderated in the Boston and Cleveland districts. Residential building permits increased in the Cleveland, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and St. Louis districts. Kansas City said strong starts of entry-level homes offset weak starts of upper-priced homes. Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco reported that low mortgage interest rates continued to drive sales in their districts.
Commercial real estate conditions remained weak in most districts during June and early July. Very little new construction activity was noted-an exception was in the St. Louis District where construction activity had begun to pick up before being delayed by inclement weather. Commercial leasing activity also remained generally stagnant, although renewals and renegotiations drove some activity in the Chicago District. In contrast to the overall sluggishness, Atlanta reported small increases in leasing and net absorption. Compared with the last Beige Book reports, vacancy rates edged higher in the Kansas City, New York, and San Francisco districts and were higher compared with a year ago in the St. Louis District. Chicago and New York reported that rents moved lower, and Richmond indicated that landlord concessions had reemerged in the office and retail sectors. However, several district reports noted pockets of improvement-leasing activity was up in the Atlanta and Minneapolis districts along with a substantial decline in vacancy rates in Lower Manhattan. Looking ahead, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, Richmond, and St. Louis reported that their contacts expected the excess commercial space currently on the market to be absorbed slowly.
Banking and Finance
Lending activity was mixed across districts in June and early July, as solid residential mortgage demand was accompanied by weak demand for commercial loans. Most districts characterized residential mortgage demand as either increasing or continuing strong. Dallas reported a surge in mortgage lending because borrowers were anticipating rising mortgage interest rates and wanted to lock in the current low rates. Demand for commercial loans, however, was described as weak in the Atlanta, Chicago, and New York reports, and as declining in the Kansas City report. Philadelphia reported that bank lending to businesses had increased, but that the rate of growth remained slow as most business borrowers apparently saw little need to expand their operations.
Several districts reported little change in credit quality. Philadelphia said that credit quality was not currently a problem, but added that some banks believed a further deterioration in business conditions could lower the credit quality of commercial loan portfolios. Kansas City noted that some bankers had expressed concern that declining used car prices had lowered the credit quality of their automobile loan portfolios.
Prices and Wages
District reports suggested that price and wage inflation remained broadly in check, although increases were noted in the energy, transportation, and insurance industries. Atlanta reported that health care insurance premiums rose at a double-digit rate in June and early July. The rising costs of employee benefits, most notably health insurance and pensions, boosted non-wage labor costs in the Chicago, Dallas, Kansas City, and San Francisco districts. Most district reports described wage increases as minimal, and Kansas City reported that firms were providing no more than cost-of-living increases. Contacts in Dallas and Kansas City noted that rising benefit costs were being passed on to employees, and San Francisco reported that higher labor costs could restrain hiring in the near-term.
Prices charged by manufacturers were generally unchanged in Boston, Cleveland, and Kansas City, but Chicago reported some firming resulting from the weaker dollar. On the flipside, prices paid for materials by manufacturers were mixed. The Boston, Cleveland, and New York districts noted stable input prices, but moderate price hikes were reported in Dallas, Kansas City, and Richmond.
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Unusually heavy thunderstorms saturated wide areas of the Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas districts in June and early July, damaging crops, delaying planting, and slowing harvesting activity. Atlanta reported reduced fieldwork in many areas as a result of Tropical Storm Bill. Because of the wet weather, Richmond noted that fewer acres of soybeans will be planted and that some of the wheat crop will not be harvested. Dallas said that hail damaged cotton in the Texas Panhandle and Chicago reported damage to some crops from severe storms. Despite the damage, Chicago said corn and soybeans were generally in good-to-excellent condition. By contrast, several districts noted that the abundant spring rains had beneficial effects. The rains eased drought conditions in much of the Kansas City District, returned the soil moisture to normal levels in St. Louis, and improved crop conditions in Minneapolis. Agricultural prices were mixed. The San Francisco District noted that crop and livestock prices had remained firm and that a lower exchange value of the dollar had boosted export activity. Minneapolis and Chicago, however, reported that milk prices remained soft.
Activity in the energy industry remained strong according to reports from the Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco districts. Minneapolis indicated that oil and natural gas exploration levels increased, while Kansas City reported that energy activity was steady in June and early July after increasing markedly during the first five months of the year. Dallas added that the level of drilling activity moved to new highs but noted that the rate of increase had slowed substantially in recent weeks, as producers tried to assess the storage situation for natural gas this summer. Kansas City reported that the end of a moratorium on new coal-bed methane drilling permits in Wyoming led to predictions of increased production of natural gas in coming months.
- (영어원문)SK글로벌 해외채권단 입장
- [edaily 오상용기자] SK글로벌 해외채권단은 20일 국내채권단이 추진하고 있는 SK글로벌의 법정관리는 바람직하지 않으며, 국내채권단과의 협상 여지가 있다"고 밝혔다. 다음은 해외채권단이 밝힌 입장 원문이다.
SK Global Foreign Creditors Maintain Deal Can Be Struck
Seoul, July 20 - Court receivership for SK Global is neither necessary nor esirable,
according to foreign creditors of the troubled SK trading unit.
In addition, creditors say, foreign banks everywhere are paying keen attention to the SK Global case because it is the first ”serious international test” of Korea’s new Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act.
“If foreign creditors’ legal rights are prejudiced and they are treated unfairly,
the cost of loans to Korean companies may rise significantly and credit lines could
even be withdrawn,” said Rod Sutton, an Executive Director of Ferrier Hodgson
Limited, the financial advisors to the foreign creditors’ steering committee.
“This may also raise significant questions about Korea’s plans to be an international financial center,” he added. “Moreover, if SK Global goes into court
receivership, it means that the new legal process has probably failed on its first
serious outing.”
Guy Isherwood, the chief representative of the SK Global foreign creditors’ steering committee, said that the “optimum solution” for SK Global would be for all its bank creditors, Korean and foreign, to “sit down and thrash out a rescue plan.”
“We have indicated our willingness to do so and remain optimistic that a deal can be struck with the domestic creditors,” Mr. Isherwood said “Indeed, until July 16, talks were ongoing between both sides.
“The main concern of foreign creditors is that any rescue plan for SK Global meet
international standards of fairness and transparency,” Mr. Isherwood explained.
“However, until now, foreign creditors have been left out of the domestic discussions and we are not confident that these standards have been met.”
Commenting on the appointment of provisional liquidators to SK’s Hong Kong
subsidiary July 17, Mr. Isherwood said, “This was inevitable given Credit Lyonnais’successful appeal against the stay on their judgement. I am pleased they took the
initiative themselves. We now have an independent officer of the court appointed in
Hong Kong with investigative powers to answer questions that have, until now, been
unanswered.”
The foreign creditors’ proposal of a 72 percent CBO rate was made on the basis of
their advisors’ analysis of the company’s financial data.
“It is simply wrong to characterize the proposal as favoring some creditors over
others,” said Edward Cairns, a Partner with White & Case L.L.P., the legal advisors
to the foreign creditors’ steering committee. “It is no more than a recognition and reflection of the legal rights of the parties concerned. The foreign creditors lent to overseas subsidiaries, supported by legally enforceable guarantees issued by SK Global. The value they receive in any restructuring should reflect the financial
position of both the subsidiary and SK Global.
“This is wholly consistent with the practice followed in previous international
restructurings of Korean companies,” Mr. Cairns said.
