뉴스 검색결과 6,863건
- (원문)美 FOMC 9월 성명서..50-50bp 전격 인하
- [뉴욕=이데일리 김기성특파원] The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 4-3/4 percent. Economic growth was moderate during the first half of the year, but the tighte ning of credit conditions has the potential to intensify the housing correctio n and to restrain economic growth more generally. Today's action is intended t o forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and to promote moder ate growth over time. Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year. However, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. Developments in financial markets since the Committee's last regular meeting h ave increased the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of these and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Timothy F. Geithner, Vice Chairman; Charles L. Evans; Thomas M. Hoenig; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Frederic S. Mishkin; William Poole; Eric Rosengren; and Kevin M. Warsh. In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 50-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 5-1/4 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York, Cleveland, St. Louis, Minneapolis, KansasCity, and San Francisco.
- 삼성SDS, 전자태그 솔루션 국내 첫 글로벌 인증
- [이데일리 지영한기자] 삼성SDS의 전자태그(RFID) 공유솔루션인 '루비IS'가 국내 최초로 글로벌 인증을 획득했다. 삼성SDS는 국내 최초로 자체 개발 에픽스(EPCIS) 솔루션 '루비(Rubi)IS 1.0'이 이피씨글로벌(EPCglobal)로부터 국제인증을 획득했다고 18일 밝혔다.에픽스는 전자태그(RFID) 네트워크(Network)중 RFID 정보를 저장 및 검색기능을 제공하는 역할을 담당하는 시스템이다. 이피씨글로벌은 전자태그에 입력되는 전자상품코드(EPC: Electric Product Code)를 관리하는 국제 민간표준기구로, 전세계 전자태그 네트워크의 모든 구성요소의 국제 표준 제정을 주도하고 있다. 또 산업분야 별로 전자태그 응용모델과 표준 개발활동을 활발히 전개하고 있다.삼성SDS는 "루비IS가 에픽스 인증을 획득한 것은 이피씨글로벌의 표준을 준수한 다른 전자태그 시스템과 언제든지 상호 호환이 가능함을 의미한다"고 밝혔다. 특히 "전 세계 에픽스들과의 상호 검색이 가능해져 언제 어디서나 필요한 전자태그 정보를 얻을 수 있는 시스템 구축이 가능하게 됐다는데 이번 인증 획득에 큰 의의가 있다."고 덧붙였다. 삼성 SDS는 이미 지난 7월에 전자태그 미들웨어인 루비웨어의 국제 인증을 획득했으며, 이번 인증 획득으로 전자태그 네트워크중 국제 표준 인증 솔루션을 2개 보유하게 되었다.이에 따라 이번 인증을 통해 삼성SDS는 전자태그 솔루션 '루비IS'가 국제 표준을 준수하고 있음을 국내 최초로 인정받게 됐으며, 이로써 전자태그 사업 경쟁력의 우위를 확보할 수 있게 되었다.삼성SDS는 "루비IS 솔루션은 이미 인천공항 항공물류 시범사업 프로젝트에 적용되어 그 진가를 인정받았으며, 현재 용평 스키장의 u-Sports에 적용 중"이라고 설명했다. 삼성SDS는 또 향후엔 루비IS와 루비웨어를 이용하여 국제 전자태그 솔루션 기술 리더로서, 국내외의 전자태그 서비스를 제공하고, 종량제를 적용한 새로운 모델 제시뿐만 아니라 전 세계의 에픽스와 연계한 유비쿼터스 인프라를 구축, 사업을 확대한다는 복안이다. 삼성SDS 정보기술연구소 박승안 상무는 "삼성SDS는 2005년부터 국제 표준화 작업에 주도적 참여하였으며, EPC 미들웨어와 EPCIS 솔루션 확보 및 국제인증을 획득했다"고 밝혔다. 박 상무는 "이는 삼성SDS가 RFID 분야에 있어 기술적 리더 기업임과 동시에 RFID 토털 솔루션을 고객에게 제공할 수 있게 됐음을 의미한다"며 "지금까지의 기술력을 바탕으로 다양한 비즈니스 모델을 발굴하여 사업화에 박차를 가할 것"이라고 밝혔다. ◇용어 ▲ RFID(Radio Frequency Identification: 전자태그): 태그에 내장된 정보를 무선 주파수를 이용, 비 접촉 방식으로 대상(물건, 사람 등)을 식별할 수 있는 기술로서 안테나와 칩으로 구성된 태그에 정보를 저장하여 적용 대상에 부착 후 리더기(판독기)로 정보를 인식하는 기술임.▲ IS: Information Services의 약자로서 읽어 들인 RFID를 저장 및 검색하는 서비스임.
- 오늘의 증시 일정(18일)
- [이데일리 안재만기자] ◇18일(화) ▲경제지표 -미국 FOMC 금리인하 여부 결정 -미국 생산자 물가지수 -유로 ZEW 조사치(이코노미스트 전망) -영국 CPI -영국 RPI 직전 모기지 이자 지급 -일본 BOJ 통화정책 회의 -중국 부동산 현황 ▲추가상장 -루트로닉(085370)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 140만원, 1만600원) -모코코(058900)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 84만1437원, 2365원) -스카이뉴팜(058820)(무상증자, 632만6861원, 500원) -CJ인터넷(037150)(스톡옵션행사, 1636원, 1만4730원) -CJ홈쇼핑(035760)(스톡옵션행사, 400원, 3만원) -유비스타(036630)(국내CB전환, 8만8129원, 1660원) -자강(036790)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 366만7890원, 545원) -한국하이네트(040180)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 491만7723원, 5356원) -현대H&S(005440)(스톡옵션행사, 500원, 4만3220원) ▲공모주청약 -상보(한화, 마감) ▲임시주주총회 -리젠(031860)(이사 선임, 감사 선임, 정관 변경, 영업 영도, 임원퇴직금 지급규정 변경, 이사 보수한도액 승인) -매일유업(005990)(이사 선임, 감사 선임) -삼진(032750)(정관 변경) -I.S하이텍(060910)(이사 선임, 사업 목적 변경) -아이즈비전(031310)(액면 변경, 정관 변경)
- 이번주 재테크 캘린더
- [이데일리 양이랑기자] ◇17일(월) ▲경제지표 -유로 유로권 무역수지 -영국 라이트무브 주택가격 -한국 할인점 매출 -한국 백화점 매출 ▲추가상장 -동부하이텍(000990)(국내CB전환, 1만2352원, 1만7300원) -서광건설(001600)산업(유상증자[3자배정포함], 348만2000원, 7180원) -서희건설(035890)(국내CB전환, 18만1653원, 1101원) -C&상선(000790)(국내CB전환, 89만8223원, 1675원) -IB스포츠(011420)(국내CB전환, 20만원, 5000원) -IC코퍼레이션(080570)(해외BW행사, 126만5723원, 1485원) -알덱스(025970)(국내CB전환, 7만9187원, 1730원) -에스와이정보(053470)통신(유상증자[3자배정포함], 315만8730원, 630원) -인성정보(033230)(스톡옵션행사, 7만9970원, 1110원) -텔레윈(015540)(해외BW행사, 37만5051원, 500원) -퓨쳐비젼(042570)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 81만2500원, 8000원) -한국선재(025550)(해외CB전환, 11만3225원, 2480원) -현대페인트(011720)공업(유상증자[3자배정포함], 9만2000원, 2만1600원) ▲임시주주총회 -엔토리노(032590)(이사 선임, 감사 선임) ▲변경상장 -메디아나전자(031800)→ST&I(상호변경) ▲공모주청약 -미래나노텍(한국, 마감) -네오티스(대우, 마감) -상보(한화, 첫날) ◇18일(화) ▲경제지표 -미국 FOMC 금리인하 여부 결정-미국 생산자 물가지수 -유로 ZEW 조사치(이코노미스트 전망) -영국 CPI -영국 RPI 직전 모기지 이자 지급 -일본 BOJ 통화정책 회의 -중국 부동산 현황 ▲추가상장 -루트로닉(085370)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 140만원, 1만600원) -모코코(058900)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 84만1437원, 2365원) -스카이뉴팜(058820)(무상증자, 632만6861원, 500원) -CJ인터넷(037150)(스톡옵션행사, 1636원, 1만4730원) -CJ홈쇼핑(035760)(스톡옵션행사, 400원, 3만원) -유비스타(036630)(국내CB전환, 8만8129원, 1660원) -자강(036790)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 366만7890원, 545원) -한국하이네트(040180)(유상증자[3자배정포함], 491만7723원, 5356원) -현대H&S(005440)(스톡옵션행사, 500원, 4만3220원) ▲공모주청약 -상보(한화, 마감) ▲임시주주총회 -리젠(031860)(이사 선임, 감사 선임, 정관 변경, 영업 영도, 임원퇴직금 지급규정 변경, 이사 보수한도액 승인) -매일유업(005990)(이사 선임, 감사 선임) -삼진(032750)(정관 변경) -I.S하이텍(060910)(이사 선임, 사업 목적 변경) -아이즈비전(031310)(액면 변경, 정관 변경) ◇19일(수) ▲경제지표-미국 연준리 기금금리-미국 NAHB 주택시장지수-미국 MBA 주택 융자 신청지수-미국 소비자 물가지수-미국 주택 착공 건수-미국 건축 허가-일본 일본은행 정책금리-일본 경기선행지수-일본 전국 백화점 판매액 ▲추가상장 -미주레일(078940)(해외BW행사, 78만3675원, 500원) -미주소재(021040)(해외BW행사, 52만2450원, 500원) -솔트웍스(031950)(일반공모[기업공개], 96만0170원, 640원) -시큐리티코리아(066330)(해외BW행사, 80만6846원, 1183원) -아이디에스(078780)(종류변경, 46만8636원, 500원) -에이스디지텍(036550)(국내CB전환, 8만6956원, 1만1500원) -엑사이엔씨(054940)(스톡옵션행사, 2만8639원, 3750원)▲신규상장-옴니시스템-연이정보통신 ◇20일(목)▲경제지표-미국 경기선행지수-영국 파이낸셜타임스주가지수(FTSE)지수위원회 연례회의..한국 선진국지수 편입 여부 주목 ▲임시주주총회-나온(058550)(정관 변경)-엑사이엔씨(054940)(합병 승인, 이사 선임, 사외이사 선임, 정관 변경, 주식매수선택권부여 승인, 주식매수선택권 부여)-엠피씨(050540)(정관 변경, 이사 선임, 감사 선임)-지오텔(074140)(합병 승인, 정관 변경, 이사 선임, 감사 선임)-케이에스피(073010)(이사 선임) ◇21일(금) ▲경제지표-유로 PMI 제조업 ▲임시주주총회-마스타테크론(045400)(이사 선임, 감사 선임, 정관 변경)-에스비텍(051780)(정관 변경)-에이치비엔터(060230)테인먼트(정관 변경, 이사 선임, 감사 선임)-이노비츠(056850)아이엔씨(이사 선임, 감사 선임, 정관 변경)-자강(036790)(자본감소 승인, 정관 변경, 이사 선임, 감사 선임) ▲신규상장-바이오톡스텍
- 한가위엔 차가 한턱 쏜다 "떡값 대신 기름값 드려요"
- [조선일보 제공] 22일부터 시작되는 추석연휴를 앞두고 국산·수입차의 9월 ‘한가위 판촉전’이 뜨겁다. 국산차 업계는 이달 구입고객에게 귀성비 명목으로 차값을 깎아주거나, 무료 시승행사를 갖는 등 다양한 판촉 행사를 마련했다. 수입차 업계는 초기 구입비용이 적게 드는 리스상품을 확대, 목돈이 적은 20·30대 젊은 층을 집중 공략한다. ◆추석전 추가할인·무료시승 챙겨보자 현대차는 차량에 따라 10만~200만원을 ‘한가위 맞이 기름값’ 명목으로 깎아준다. 기아차도 차종별로 10만~40만원 깎아주고, 카니발·카렌스 구입고객에겐 60만원 상당의 사이버 어학상품권을 준다. GM대우는 토스카·윈스톰에 한해 3년 뒤 차값의 50%를 보장해주는 ‘중고차 보장할부’를 연장 실시하고, 마티즈·라세티는 차값을 깎아준다. 르노삼성도 차종에 따라 20만~50만원 할인한다. 쌍용차도 10만~200만원까지 할인행사를 실시 중이다. 또 현대차는 이달 전시장을 찾는 고객 중 20명을 추첨해 40인치 LCD TV를 제공하고, 그랜드 스타렉스 출고 고객 전원에게 펜션 숙박권과 차량용 휴대전화 충전기를 준다. 추석연휴 기간인 21~27일에 차량을 공짜로 빌려주는 행사도 마감을 앞두고 있다. i30(아이써티) 50대를 비롯, 총 300대를 준비했다. 13일까지 현대차 홈페이지·영업소에서 신청을 받는다. 기아차도 16일까지 홈페이지 응모 고객 중 60명을 뽑아, 21~27일 차량을 공짜로 빌려준다. 당첨 고객에게는 5만원 주유상품권과 60만원 상당의 사이버 어학상품권도 제공한다. 쌍용차는 16일까지 영업소를 방문한 고객 중 30명을 추첨, 뉴로디우스 11인승을 추석연휴 기간 무료로 탈 수 있는 기회를 준다. ◆수입차 업계, 목돈 없는 젊은 고객 유혹 볼보는 10월 말까지 C30 2.4i와 터보모델인 C30 T5에 특별유예 금융프로그램을 실시한다. 볼보 C30 2.4i의 경우, 차값(3290만원)의 35%인 1151만5000원을 구입 시 지불하고 36개월간 월 38만3000원을 납입하고 타면 된다. 이후 차값의 40%인 1316만원의 유예금을 완납하면 차량을 소유할 수 있다. 이번 프로그램으로 C30 2.4i를 구매하면 70만원 주유상품권, C30 T5를 구매하면 100만원 주유상품권을 준다. 한국도요타는 9월 렉서스 ES350을 운용리스로 구입하는 고객을 대상으로 저금리 금융 프로그램을 실시한다. 계약기간 36개월에 차값의 30%를 보증금으로 설정할 경우, 기존의 연리 6.3%에서 3.99%로 이자율을 낮춰 적용받을 수 있다. 또 9월부터 렉서스 ES350과 IS250 구입고객을 대상으로 유예할부 리스도 실시한다. 차값의 30%를 선수금으로 납입하면, IS250(판매가격 4650만원)은 36개월간 월 49만3597원씩, ES350(판매가격 6520만원)은 월 60만6059원씩 부담하면 된다. 계약 기간이 끝난 뒤엔 유예원금에 추가리스를 설정하거나, 나머지 비용을 완납하고 차를 소유할 수 있다. 푸조의 국내 공식수입원인 한불모터스도 9월 한 달간 푸조 207의 특별 금융리스를 실시한다. 차값의 30%를 선수금으로 납입할 경우, 36개월간 207GT(해치백)는 월 29만5000원, 207CC(하드톱 컨버터블)는 36만5000원을 내고 탈 수 있다. 이후 리스기간을 연장하거나, 납부 유예금(차값의 50%)을 완납하면 차량을 가질 수 있다. BMW는 Z4 3.0si 쿠페의 경우 차값(7290만원)의 30%인 2187만원을 선납하고, 36개월간 월 42만8564원을 내는 프로그램을 실시한다. 계약이 끝난 뒤 유예금 4009만5000원에 대해 리스를 연장하거나 이를 완불한 뒤 차량을 소유할 수 있다. 또 월 30만원대로 328i(배기량 3리터)를 탈 수 있는 특별 리스프로그램도 마련했다. 차값(6390만원)의 30%에 해당하는 1917만원을 선수금으로 납부하고, 36개월간 월 39만6446원을 납입하면 된다. 유예금 3514만5000원은 리스를 연장하거나 완불 뒤 해당 차량을 소유할 수 있다. 혼다는 레전드 구매 고객에게 무이자 할부와 내비게이션을 제공한다. 어코드 2.4 구매고객에게는 DMB내비게이션과 액세서리 패키지를 무료 장착해준다. 어코드 3.0 고객에게는 DMB내비게이션을 달아주고 등록세(5%)를 지원한다. 크라이슬러는 뉴 세브링, 300C 3.5, 닷지 캘리버 등 주요 차종의 디젤 모델을 대상으로 등록세(5%)와 취득세(2%)를 전액 지원해준다. 그랜드보이저 디젤은 취·등록세 지원과 36개월 무이자 혜택 중 하나를 선택할 수 있다.
- 유무선 통합 UCC 시대 열린다
- [이데일리 박지환기자] SK텔레콤(017670)이 휴대폰으로 미니홈피나 블로그에 사용자제작컨텐츠(UCC)를 자유롭게 올리고 내릴 수 있는 UCC허브(Hub)사이트 ‘아이스박스’를 오픈한다.SK텔레콤은 6일 UCC 사이트 뿐 아니라 외부 블로그와 미니홈피에도 동시에 UCC를 올리고 관리할 수 있는 UCC 허브 사이트 ‘아이스박스’(I’s box)의 시험 페이지를 오픈, 클로즈 베타 테스트(Close Beta Test)에 참여할 체험단을 모집한다고 밝혔다.SK텔레콤은 1000명 규모의 체험단을 이달 20일까지 모집하고, 테스트 기간을 거쳐 11월에 아이스박스는 오픈할 예정이다.휴대폰 이용이 가능한 ‘아이스 박스’는 외부 블로그나 미니홈피와 연동이 기능하고, 지인맵 기능을 통해 사이버 상의 인맥형성 지원이나 사이트에서의 동영상 편집도 할 수 있다.특히 이용자는 휴대폰으로 촬영한 사진과 동영상 UCC를 아이스박스로 전송할 수 있다. 또 별도의 정보 이용료 없이 휴대폰으로 아이스박스에 올려 놓은 UCC를 감상할 수 있으며, 심야 자동전송기능을 활용하면 촬영한 동영상과 사진을 편리하게 미니홈피나 블로그에 올릴 수 있다. 현재 ‘아이스박스’에서 접속할 수 있는 블로그는 다음, 엠파스, 이글루스, 미투데이 등의 포털에서 운영중인 블로그이며, SK텔레콤은 향후 제휴 포탈 및 블로그 사이트를 확대할 계획이다.체험단 신청은 아이스박스 웹페이지(www.isbox.com)을 참조하면 된다. 한편 SK텔레콤은 체험단 가운데 163명을 선정해 UCC제작지원금 100만원(1명), 해외여행상품권(2), UCC 전용 캠코더(10명) 등의 푸짐한 경품을 제공할 방침이다.
- 김용덕 위원장, 서브프라임 위험성 재차 경고
- [이데일리 김병수기자] 김용덕 금융감독위원장이 美 서브프라임 문제의 국내 파급효과 및 위험성에 대해 재차 경고하고 나섰다. 3일 금융감독당국에 따르면, 김용독 위원장은 지난 주 금감원내 사내망을 통해 로렌스 서머스 하버드대 교수의 FT 기고문을 소개하고, 전 직원이 필독할 것을 지시했다.[로렌스 서머스 교수의 기고문은 하단 참고] 취임하자마자 업무보고를 받는 자리에서 안이한 상황판단에 질책을 한데 이어, 서브프라임 문제에 대한 두번째 언급이어서 주목받고 있다. 이 기고문에서 로렌스 서머스 교수는 과거 3년에 한번씩 발생한 금융시장의 혼란을 설명하며, '현재의 상황은 시장 전반적으로 자신감 과잉과 신용평가기관들에 대한 신뢰감 상실'이라고 진단했다. 이어 '현재의 상황이 진정되고 있는지 여부는 아직 판단할 수 없으며, 금융부문에서 더 큰 파장이 있을 지 모른다'고 언급하고, '美 중앙은행(FRB)은 은행에 대한 대출을 늘리고 차입비용을 줄여 시장의 신뢰를 회복하고자 하지만, 이는 효과없는 일일지도 모른다'며 '은행을 금융위기시 공적 금융기관으로 활용하는 것이 과연 현명할 것일까'라는 의문을 제기하기도 했다. 그는 또 '과거 저축대부조합 파산사태에서 얻은 교훈은 단기 차입을 통해 장기 고정금리대출을 하는 예금보험 가입 은행들이 주택담보대출을 하는 것은 매우 위험할 수 있다는 것이었으나, 현재 유동화와 변동금리, 예금보험 미가입 금융기관을 통한 대출이 일반화된 현행 시스템 역시 실패하고 말았다'고 평가했다. 그는 스스로를 '모기지시장에서 영업하고 있는 프레디맥, 패니매 등 국책 금융기관들을 지원하는 정부의 준보증제도의 실효성에 의문을 품고 있는 사람중 하나'라고 소개하고 '다만, 지금 변동금리로 차입자들의 금리부담이 높아지고 있는 이때, 당국자들이 지나치게 신중한 자세를 견지해 신용시장의 활성화를 저해해서는 안된다'고 지적하기도 했다. 어찌됐건 김 위원장이 스스로의 생각을 직접적으로 얘기하지 않고 로렌스 서머스 교수의 글을 제시하는 방식으로, 서브프라임 문제의 국내 파급 효과와 감독당국의 대처를 주문한 이번 의사소통 방식은 여러 측면에서 논란이 되고 있다. 실제로 김 위원장은 '서브프라임 문제가 실물경제에 미칠 파장에 대해 다소 안이하게 금융감독당국이 대처하고 있지 않느냐'는 생각을 'FRB가 나서는 이유가 있지 않겠느냐'는 식으로 이미 밝혔고, 또한 '위기 때 당국자는 말을 아껴야 한다'는 시그널도 보냈다. 이번 로렌스 서머스 하버드대 교수의 기고문도 보기에 따라선 매우 광범위한 화두를 던지고 있는 글이어서, 필독을 지시받기는 했지만 감독당국 책임자들로서는 김 위원장이 정말로 하고 싶은 얘기가 무엇인지 다소 혼란스러워 하는 분위기도 형성되고 있다. 감독당국 한 관계자는 "이 글을 통해 김 위원장의 분명한 메시지를 이해하기는 다소 어려운 측면이 있는 것 같다"면서도 "위원장이 서브프라임 문제에 대해 많은 관심을 보이고 있는 만큼 감독당국 차원에서 혹시나 발생할지 모르는 상황에 대한 면밀한 점검은 필요한 것 같다"고 말했다. [로렌스 서머스 교수의 FT 기고문(07. 8. 27)]-지금이 페니매와 프레디맥이 나서야 할 때(This is where Fannie and Freddie step in)1987년의 주식시장 붕괴를 시작으로, 지난 20년 간 3년에 한 번씩은 금융시장의 혼란이 있어 왔다. 1990년대 초반의 미국 저축대부조합(Savings&Loans) 파산과 신용위기, 1994년 멕시코 금융위기, 1997년의 아시아 금융위기와 1998년의 러시아 모라토리엄 선언 및 LTCM 사태, 2000년의 IT 버블 붕괴, 2001년 9.11 사태 이후 지급결제시스템의 혼란, 그리고 2002년 엔론 파산 이후 신용시장에서의 신용위축 우려(deflationary scare) 등이 그것이다. 이러한 기록을 보았을 때, 2007년은 대규모 금융위기 발생시점이 지난 것처럼(overdue) 보일 수 있다. 하지만 아니나 다를까, 서브프라임 모기지 부실로 발생한 문제점들이 처음에는 그 파장이 제한적인 것처럼 보였으나, 결국 시장에서 가장 우량한 금융기관들의 신용도까지 의심받게 되고, 앞다투어 美 국채를 사들이기 시작하면서 차츰 시스템 전반의 문제로까지 확산되어 갔다. 금융위기는 그 세부적인 내용을 보면 각각 다르지만, 문학작품에도 공통적인 이야기 구조가 있듯 금융위기 역시 공통의 구조(arc)를 따르고 있다. 첫째로, 투자자들이 과거에 성공을 거뒀던 투자전략을 맹신하게 됨에 따라, 자산가격이 상승하고 차입수준이 높아지며 시장 전반적으로 자신감 과잉의 시기가 도래한다. 둘째로, 투자자들로 하여금 보다 안전한 자산을 찾게 하는 사건이 발생한다. 현 상황에 놓고 본다면, 서브프라임 모기지 부문의 문제점 노출과 이에 따른 신용평가기관들에 대한 신뢰감 상실이 이러한 사건이라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 셋째로, 투자자들이 앞다투어 투자를 회수함에 따라 리스크분석의 초점은 근본적 요인보다는 투자자 행태(investor behaviour)에 더욱 비중을 두게 된다. 먼저 일부 투자자들이 자산을 매각함에 따라 자산가격이 하락하고, 그 결과 다른 투자자들도 자산을 매각하지 않으면 안 되는 상황에 놓이면서 가격은 더욱 하락하기 마련이다. 매물이 쏟아질 것이란 기대감이 팽배하면서, 몇 주 전까지만 해도 상상하기 어려웠던 가격변동세가 이어지게 된다. 신용경색은 실물경제에도 악영향을 미친다. 결국, 시간이 지나 충분한 가격조정이 있은 후에 극단적 공포심이 사라지고 시장참가자들이 다시 탐욕(greed)적 행위를 추구하면서, 시장은 원래 모습을 찾아가게 된다. 이와 같은 과정은 1987년이나 1998년의 미국의 경우와 같이 수개월 내일 수도 있고, 1990년대의 일본처럼 10년 이상 걸릴 수도 있다. 오로지 시간이 지난 후에야 우리가 현재 이 사이클에서 어디쯤 와 있는지 알 수 있을 것이다. 지난 한주 동안은 시장이 정상화 되어가는 움직임을 보였으나, 이것이 단순한 반등인지 아니면 위기가 끝나가는 것인지는 아직 판단할 수 없다. 금융부문에 더 큰 파장이 있을지 아직 모른다. 또한 지난 몇 년간 미국경제 성장의 주축이 되어 온 소비자신뢰 및 소비에 끼친 영향도 파악되지 않고 있다. 정책적인 교훈을 얻기에는 아직 이른 시기일지 모르나, 금번 위기로부터 세 가지 정도의 문제를 제기할 수 있다. 첫째로, 매우 높은 신용등급을 받은 채권들이 실제로는 위험하고 부도 위기에 있었다는 것이 알려짐에 따라, 신용평가사들에 대한 신뢰도가 추락하면서 이번 위기는 더욱 악화되었다. 신용평가사들의 잘못된 신용등급 책정이 복잡한 신용상품의 등장으로 과거보다 분석이 어려워짐에 따른 것인지, 아니면 기업들이 신용평가사에 신용등급 책정에 따른 보수를 지불함에 따른 이해상충 때문인지는 논란의 여지가 있을 수 있다. 하지만, 과거 멕시코 및 아시아 금융위기, 그리고 엔론사태 때와 마찬가지로 신용평가사들이 실수를 저질렀다는 데에는 의심의 여지가 없다. 이러한 점을 고려하였을 때, 은행의 자본규제기준이나 수많은 투자자 안내 지침 등이 과연 신용등급에 근거해야 하는 것일까? 만약 아니라면 과연 어떤 대안이 존재하는 것인가? 사베인스-옥슬리법은 엔론사태로 야기된 기업회계의 문제점을 해소하는 데에 적절한 대응은 아니었다고 볼 수 있다. 신용등급 책정의 문제점을 해소하기 위해, 어떠한 대응방안을 입법화(legislative response)하는 것이 적절한가? 둘째로, 정책 입안자들은 비은행 금융기관들과 관련된 이런 위기사태에 대해 어떻게 대처해야 하는 것인가? 미국 금융시스템의 대전제중 하나는 은행들이 중앙은행(FRB)의 할인창구 및 지급결제를 이용하는 대가로 보다 철저한 감독의 대상이 된다는 것이다. 이번 사태에서의 문제점은 은행들의 자본 부족 및 자금 조달 애로가 아니다. 그보다, 비은행들의 지불능력 약화가 더욱 큰 문제다. 이러한 지불능력의 약화는 비은행들의 경영여건에 대한 우려뿐만 아니라, 투자자들이 이런 비은행들에 대한 신뢰감을 상실하면서 투자금을 회수하여 안전자산으로 도피하는 것으로부터 비롯된다. 중앙은행이 은행에 대한 대출을 늘리고 차입비용을 줄여 줌으로써 시장의 신뢰를 회복하려고 하나, 이는 효과가 없는 일(pushing on a string)일지 모른다. 은행을 금융위기시 공적 금융기관으로 활용하는 것이 과연 현명한 것일까? 비은행 금융기관에 대한 대출 확대 및 규제 강화가 있어야 하는 것인가?셋째로, 주택부문의 신용활성화를 위한 정부당국의 역할은 무엇인가? 저축대부조합 파산 사태로부터 얻은 교훈은 단기로 차입하여 장기 고정금리대출을 하는 예금보험 가입 은행들이 주택담보대출을 하는 것이 매우 위험할 수 있다는 것이었다. 그러나, 유동화(securitization)와 변동금리, 예금보험 미가입 금융기관을 통한 대출이 일반화된 현행 시스템 역시 실패하고 말았다. 나는 모기지시장에서 영업하고 있는 프레디맥, 패니매 등 국책 금융기관들을 지원하는 정부의 준(quasi)보증 제도의 실효성에 대한 의문을 품고 있는 사람 중의 하나이다. 그렇지만 만약 그들의 영업 확장이 진정 필요할 때가 있다면 그것은 모기지시장의 유동성이 증발되고 있는 바로 지금일 것이다. 의심의 여지가 없이, 서브프라임 시장의 대출기준은 너무 오랫동안, 너무 낮았던 것이 사실이다. 지금 변동금리에 따라 차입자들의 금리 부담이 높아지고 있는 이때, 당국자들이 지나치게 신중한 자세를 견지하여 신용시장의 활성화를 저해해서는 안 된다. 만일 이번 신용위기로 인해 지금까지 나열한 문제점들에 대해 고찰해 볼 수 있는 기회가 주어진다면, 이는 우리가 이번 위기를 통해 얻을 수 있는 좋은 점이라고 할 수 있을 것이다.<참고>-프레디맥과 페니매는 금융기관으로부터 모기지론을 사들여 유동화하는 국책 금융기관으로, 美연방주택기업감독청(Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, OFHEO)의 감독을 받으며 현행 각사의 모기지론 보유한도는 약 7000억달러임.-프레디맥과 페니매는 모기지 금융시장 신용경색 해소를 위해 자사의 모기지론 보유 한도를 확대해 줄 것을 감독당국에 요청하였으나 부시행정부는 이에 대해 소극적인 입장임.
- 벤 버냉키 연준 의장 `잭슨홀` 연설 원문
- [뉴욕=이데일리 전설리특파원] Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy Over the years, Tom Hoenig and his colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City have done an excellent job of selecting interesting and relevant topics for this annual symposium. I think I can safely say that this year they have outdone themselves. Recently, the subject of housing finance has preoccupied financial-market participants and observers in the United States and around the world. The financial turbulence we have seen had its immediate origins in the problems in the subprime mortgage market, but the effects have been felt in the broader mortgage market and in financial markets more generally, with potential consequences for the performance of the overall economy. In my remarks this morning, I will begin with some observations about recent market developments and their economic implications. I will then try to place recent events in a broader historical context by discussing the evolution of housing markets and housing finance in the United States. In particular, I will argue that, over the years, institutional changes in U.S. housing and mortgage markets have significantly influenced both the transmission of monetary policy and the economy's cyclical dynamics. As our system of housing finance continues to evolve, understanding these linkages not only provides useful insights into the past but also holds the promise of helping us better cope with the implications of future developments. Recent Developments in Financial Markets and the Economy I will begin my review of recent developments by discussing the housing situation. As you know, the downturn in the housing market, which began in the summer of 2005, has been sharp. Sales of new and existing homes have declined significantly from their mid-2005 peaks and have remained slow in recent months. As demand has weakened, house prices have decelerated or even declined by some measures, and homebuilders have scaled back their construction of new homes. The cutback in residential construction has directly reduced the annual rate of U.S. economic growth about 3/4 percentage point on average over the past year and a half. Despite the slowdown in construction, the stock of unsold new homes remains quite elevated relative to sales, suggesting that further declines in homebuilding are likely. The outlook for home sales and construction will also depend on unfolding developments in mortgage markets. A substantial increase in lending to nonprime borrowers contributed to the bulge in residential investment in 2004 and 2005, and the tightening of credit conditions for these borrowers likely accounts for some of the continued softening in demand we have seen this year. As I will discuss, recent market developments have resulted in additional tightening of rates and terms for nonprime borrowers as well as for potential borrowers through "jumbo" mortgages. Obviously, if current conditions persist in mortgage markets, the demand for homes could weaken further, with possible implications for the broader economy. We are following these developments closely. As house prices have softened, and as interest rates have risen from the low levels of a couple of years ago, we have seen a marked deterioration in the performance of nonprime mortgages. The problems have been most severe for subprime mortgages with adjustable rates: the proportion of those loans with serious delinquencies rose to about 13-1/2 percent in June, more than double the recent low seen in mid-2005.1 The adjustable-rate subprime mortgages originated in late 2005 and in 2006 have performed the worst, in part because of slippage in underwriting standards, reflected for example in high loan-to-value ratios and incomplete documentation. With many of these borrowers facing their first interest rate resets in coming quarters, and with softness in house prices expected to continue to impede refinancing, delinquencies among this class of mortgages are likely to rise further. Apart from adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, however, the deterioration in performance has been less pronounced, at least to this point. For subprime mortgages with fixed rather than variable rates, for example, serious delinquencies have been fairly stable at about 5-1/2 percent. The rate of serious delinquencies on alt-A securitized pools rose to nearly 3 percent in June, from a low of less than 1 percent in mid-2005. Delinquency rates on prime jumbo mortgages have also risen, though they are lower than those for prime conforming loans, and both rates are below 1 percent. Investors' concerns about mortgage credit performance have intensified sharply in recent weeks, reflecting, among other factors, worries about the housing market and the effects of impending interest-rate resets on borrowers' ability to remain current. Credit spreads on new securities backed by subprime mortgages, which had jumped earlier this year, rose significantly more in July. Issuance of such securities has been negligible since then, as dealers have faced difficulties placing even the AAA-rated tranches. Issuance of securities backed by alt-A and prime jumbo mortgages also has fallen sharply, as investors have evidently become concerned that the losses associated with these types of mortgages may be higher than had been expected. With securitization impaired, some major lenders have announced the cancellation of their adjustable-rate subprime lending programs. A number of others that specialize in nontraditional mortgages have been forced by funding pressures to scale back or close down. Some lenders that sponsor asset-backed commercial paper conduits as bridge financing for their mortgage originations have been unable to "roll" the maturing paper, forcing them to draw on back-up liquidity facilities or to exercise options to extend the maturity of their paper. As a result of these developments, borrowers face noticeably tighter terms and standards for all but conforming mortgages. As you know, the financial stress has not been confined to mortgage markets. The markets for asset-backed commercial paper and for lower-rated unsecured commercial paper market also have suffered from pronounced declines in investor demand, and the associated flight to quality has contributed to surges in the demand for short-dated Treasury bills, pushing T-bill rates down sharply on some days. Swings in stock prices have been sharp, with implied price volatilities rising to about twice the levels seen in the spring. Credit spreads for a range of financial instruments have widened, notably for lower-rated corporate credits. Diminished demand for loans and bonds to finance highly leveraged transactions has increased some banks' concerns that they may have to bring significant quantities of these instruments onto their balance sheets. These banks, as well as those that have committed to serve as back-up facilities to commercial paper programs, have become more protective of their liquidity and balance-sheet capacity. Although this episode appears to have been triggered largely by heightened concerns about subprime mortgages, global financial losses have far exceeded even the most pessimistic projections of credit losses on those loans. In part, these wider losses likely reflect concerns that weakness in U.S. housing will restrain overall economic growth. But other factors are also at work. Investor uncertainty has increased significantly, as the difficulty of evaluating the risks of structured products that can be opaque or have complex payoffs has become more evident. Also, as in many episodes of financial stress, uncertainty about possible forced sales by leveraged participants and a higher cost of risk capital seem to have made investors hesitant to take advantage of possible buying opportunities. More generally, investors may have become less willing to assume risk. Some increase in the premiums that investors require to take risk is probably a healthy development on the whole, as these premiums have been exceptionally low for some time. However, in this episode, the shift in risk attitudes has interacted with heightened concerns about credit risks and uncertainty about how to evaluate those risks to create significant market stress. On the positive side of the ledger, we should recognize that past efforts to strengthen capital positions and the financial infrastructure place the global financial system in a relatively strong position to work through this process. In the statement following its August 7 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognized that the rise in financial volatility and the tightening of credit conditions for some households and businesses had increased the downside risks to growth somewhat but reiterated that inflation risks remained its predominant policy concern. In subsequent days, however, following several events that led investors to believe that credit risks might be larger and more pervasive than previously thought, the functioning of financial markets became increasingly impaired. Liquidity dried up and spreads widened as many market participants sought to retreat from certain types of asset exposures altogether. Well-functioning financial markets are essential for a prosperous economy. As the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve seeks to promote general financial stability and to help to ensure that financial markets function in an orderly manner. In response to the developments in the financial markets in the period following the FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve provided reserves to address unusual strains in money markets. On August 17, the Federal Reserve Board announced a cut in the discount rate of 50 basis points and adjustments in the Reserve Banks' usual discount window practices to facilitate the provision of term financing for as long as thirty days, renewable by the borrower. The Federal Reserve also took a number of supplemental actions, such as cutting the fee charged for lending Treasury securities. The purpose of the discount window actions was to assure depositories of the ready availability of a backstop source of liquidity. Even if banks find that borrowing from the discount window is not immediately necessary, the knowledge that liquidity is available should help alleviate concerns about funding that might otherwise constrain depositories from extending credit or making markets. The Federal Reserve stands ready to take additional actions as needed to provide liquidity and promote the orderly functioning of markets. It is not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve--nor would it be appropriate--to protect lenders and investors from the consequences of their financial decisions. But developments in financial markets can have broad economic effects felt by many outside the markets, and the Federal Reserve must take those effects into account when determining policy. In a statement issued simultaneously with the discount window announcement, the FOMC indicated that the deterioration in financial market conditions and the tightening of credit since its August 7 meeting had appreciably increased the downside risks to growth. In particular, the further tightening of credit conditions, if sustained, would increase the risk that the current weakness in housing could be deeper or more prolonged than previously expected, with possible adverse effects on consumer spending and the economy more generally. The incoming data indicate that the economy continued to expand at a moderate pace into the summer, despite the sharp correction in the housing sector. However, in light of recent financial developments, economic data bearing on past months or quarters may be less useful than usual for our forecasts of economic activity and inflation. Consequently, we will pay particularly close attention to the timeliest indicators, as well as information gleaned from our business and banking contacts around the country. Inevitably, the uncertainty surrounding the outlook will be greater than normal, presenting a challenge to policymakers to manage the risks to their growth and price stability objectives. The Committee continues to monitor the situation and will act as needed to limit the adverse effects on the broader economy that may arise from the disruptions in financial markets. Beginnings: Mortgage Markets in the Early Twentieth Century Like us, our predecessors grappled with the economic and policy implications of innovations and institutional changes in housing finance. In the remainder of my remarks, I will try to set the stage for this weekend's conference by discussing the historical evolution of the mortgage market and some of the implications of that evolution for monetary policy and the economy. The early decades of the twentieth century are a good starting point for this review, as urbanization and the exceptionally rapid population growth of that period created a strong demand for new housing. Between 1890 and 1930, the number of housing units in the United States grew from about 10 million to about 30 million; the pace of homebuilding was particularly brisk during the economic boom of the 1920s. Remarkably, this rapid expansion of the housing stock took place despite limited sources of mortgage financing and typical lending terms that were far less attractive than those to which we are accustomed today. Required down payments, usually about half of the home's purchase price, excluded many households from the market. Also, by comparison with today's standards, the duration of mortgage loans was short, usually ten years or less. A "balloon" payment at the end of the loan often created problems for borrowers.2 High interest rates on loans reflected the illiquidity and the essentially unhedgeable interest rate risk and default risk associated with mortgages. Nationwide, the average spread between mortgage rates and high-grade corporate bond yields during the 1920s was about 200 basis points, compared with about 50 basis points on average since the mid-1980s. The absence of a national capital market also produced significant regional disparities in borrowing costs. Hard as it may be to conceive today, rates on mortgage loans before World War I were at times as much as 2 to 4 percentage points higher in some parts of the country than in others, and even in 1930, regional differences in rates could be more than a full percentage point.3 Despite the underdevelopment of the mortgage market, homeownership rates rose steadily after the turn of the century. As would often be the case in the future, government policy provided some inducement for homebuilding. When the federal income tax was introduced in 1913, it included an exemption for mortgage interest payments, a provision that is a powerful stimulus to housing demand even today. By 1930, about 46 percent of nonfarm households owned their own homes, up from about 37 percent in 1890. The limited availability of data prior to 1929 makes it hard to quantify the role of housing in the monetary policy transmission mechanism during the early twentieth century. Comparisons are also complicated by great differences between then and now in monetary policy frameworks and tools. Still, then as now, periods of tight money were reflected in higher interest rates and a greater reluctance of banks to lend, which affected conditions in mortgage markets. Moreover, students of the business cycle, such as Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell, have observed that residential construction was highly cyclical and contributed significantly to fluctuations in the overall economy (Burns and Mitchell, 1946). Indeed, if we take the somewhat less reliable data for 1901 to 1929 at face value, real housing investment was about three times as volatile during that era as it has been over the past half-century. During the past century we have seen two great sea changes in the market for housing finance. The first of these was the product of the New Deal. The second arose from financial innovation and a series of crises from the 1960s to the mid-1980s in depository funding of mortgages. I will turn first to the New Deal period. The New Deal and the Housing Market The housing sector, like the rest of the economy, was profoundly affected by the Great Depression. When Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, almost 10 percent of all homes were in foreclosure (Green and Wachter, 2005), construction employment had fallen by half from its late 1920s peak, and a banking system near collapse was providing little new credit. As in other sectors, New Deal reforms in housing and housing finance aimed to foster economic revival through government programs that either provided financing directly or strengthened the institutional and regulatory structure of private credit markets. Actually, one of the first steps in this direction was taken not by Roosevelt but by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, who oversaw the creation of the Federal Home Loan Banking System in 1932. This measure reorganized the thrift industry (savings and loans and mutual savings banks) under federally chartered associations and established a credit reserve system modeled after the Federal Reserve. The Roosevelt administration pushed this and other programs affecting housing finance much further. In 1934, his administration oversaw the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). By providing a federally backed insurance system for mortgage lenders, the FHA was designed to encourage lenders to offer mortgages on more attractive terms. This intervention appears to have worked in that, by the 1950s, most new mortgages were for thirty years at fixed rates, and down payment requirements had fallen to about 20 percent. In 1938, the Congress chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, as it came to be known. The new institution was authorized to issue bonds and use the proceeds to purchase FHA mortgages from lenders, with the objectives of increasing the supply of mortgage credit and reducing variations in the terms and supply of credit across regions.4 Shaped to a considerable extent by New Deal reforms and regulations, the postwar mortgage market took on the form that would last for several decades. The market had two main sectors. One, the descendant of the pre-Depression market sector, consisted of savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and, to a lesser extent, commercial banks. With financing from short-term deposits, these institutions made conventional fixed-rate long-term loans to homebuyers. Notably, federal and state regulations limited geographical diversification for these lenders, restricting interstate banking and obliging thrifts to make mortgage loans in small local areas--within 50 miles of the home office until 1964, and within 100 miles after that. In the other sector, the product of New Deal programs, private mortgage brokers and other lenders originated standardized loans backed by the FHA and the Veterans' Administration (VA). These guaranteed loans could be held in portfolio or sold to institutional investors through a nationwide secondary market. No discussion of the New Deal's effect on the housing market and the monetary transmission mechanism would be complete without reference to Regulation Q--which was eventually to exemplify the law of unintended consequences. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 gave the Federal Reserve the authority to impose deposit-rate ceilings on banks, an authority that was later expanded to cover thrift institutions. The Fed used this authority in establishing its Regulation Q. The so-called Reg Q ceilings remained in place in one form or another until the mid-1980s.5 The original rationale for deposit ceilings was to reduce "excessive" competition for bank deposits, which some blamed as a cause of bank failures in the early 1930s. In retrospect, of course, this was a dubious bit of economic analysis. In any case, the principal effects of the ceilings were not on bank competition but on the supply of credit. With the ceilings in place, banks and thrifts experienced what came to be known as disintermediation--an outflow of funds from depositories that occurred whenever short-term money-market rates rose above the maximum that these institutions could pay. In the absence of alternative funding sources, the loss of deposits prevented banks and thrifts from extending mortgage credit to new customers. The Transmission Mechanism and the New Deal Reforms Under the New Deal system, housing construction soared after World War II, driven by the removal of wartime building restrictions, the need to replace an aging housing stock, rapid family formation that accompanied the beginning of the baby boom, and large-scale internal migration. The stock of housing units grew 20 percent between 1940 and 1950, with most of the new construction occurring after 1945. In 1951, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord freed the Fed from the obligation to support Treasury bond prices. Monetary policy began to focus on influencing short-term money markets as a means of affecting economic activity and inflation, foreshadowing the Federal Reserve's current use of the federal funds rate as a policy instrument. Over the next few decades, housing assumed a leading role in the monetary transmission mechanism, largely for two reasons: Reg Q and the advent of high inflation. The Reg Q ceilings were seldom binding before the mid-1960s, but disintermediation induced by the ceilings occurred episodically from the mid-1960s until Reg Q began to be phased out aggressively in the early 1980s. The impact of disintermediation on the housing market could be quite significant; for example, a moderate tightening of monetary policy in 1966 contributed to a 23 percent decline in residential construction between the first quarter of 1966 and the first quarter of 1967. State usury laws and branching restrictions worsened the episodes of disintermediation by placing ceilings on lending rates and limiting the flow of funds between local markets. For the period 1960 to 1982, when Reg Q assumed its greatest importance, statistical analysis shows a high correlation between single-family housing starts and the growth of small time deposits at thrifts, suggesting that disintermediation effects were powerful; in contrast, since 1983 this correlation is essentially zero.6 Economists at the time were well aware of the importance of the disintermediation phenomenon for monetary policy. Frank de Leeuw and Edward Gramlich highlighted this particular channel in their description of an early version of the MPS macroeconometric model, a joint product of researchers at the Federal Reserve, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania (de Leeuw and Gramlich, 1969). The model attributed almost one-half of the direct first-year effects of monetary policy on the real economy--which were estimated to be substantial--to disintermediation and other housing-related factors, despite the fact that residential construction accounted for only 4 percent of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at the time. As time went on, however, monetary policy mistakes and weaknesses in the structure of the mortgage market combined to create deeper economic problems. For reasons that have been much analyzed, in the late 1960s and the 1970s the Federal Reserve allowed inflation to rise, which led to corresponding increases in nominal interest rates. Increases in short-term nominal rates not matched by contractually set rates on existing mortgages exposed a fundamental weakness in the system of housing finance, namely, the maturity mismatch between long-term mortgage credit and the short-term deposits that commercial banks and thrifts used to finance mortgage lending. This mismatch led to a series of liquidity crises and, ultimately, to a rash of insolvencies among mortgage lenders. High inflation was also ultimately reflected in high nominal long-term rates on new mortgages, which had the effect of "front loading" the real payments made by holders of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. This front-loading reduced affordability and further limited the extension of mortgage credit, thereby restraining construction activity. Reflecting these factors, housing construction experienced a series of pronounced boom and bust cycles from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, which contributed in turn to substantial swings in overall economic growth. The Emergence of Capital Markets as a Source of Housing Finance The manifest problems associated with relying on short-term deposits to fund long-term mortgage lending set in train major changes in financial markets and financial instruments, which collectively served to link mortgage lending more closely to the broader capital markets. The shift from reliance on specialized portfolio lenders financed by deposits to a greater use of capital markets represented the second great sea change in mortgage finance, equaled in importance only by the events of the New Deal. Government actions had considerable influence in shaping this second revolution. In 1968, Fannie Mae was split into two agencies: the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and the re-chartered Fannie Mae, which became a privately owned government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), authorized to operate in the secondary market for conventional as well as guaranteed mortgage loans. In 1970, to compete with Fannie Mae in the secondary market, another GSE was created--the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac. Also in 1970, Ginnie Mae issued the first mortgage pass-through security, followed soon after by Freddie Mac. In the early 1980s, Freddie Mac introduced collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), which separated the payments from a pooled set of mortgages into "strips" carrying different effective maturities and credit risks. Since 1980, the outstanding volume of GSE mortgage-backed securities has risen from less than $200 billion to more than $4 trillion today. Alongside these developments came the establishment of private mortgage insurers, which competed with the FHA, and private mortgage pools, which bundled loans not handled by the GSEs, including loans that did not meet GSE eligibility criteria--so-called nonconforming loans. Today, these private pools account for around $2 trillion in residential mortgage debt. These developments did not occur in time to prevent a large fraction of the thrift industry from becoming effectively insolvent by the early 1980s in the wake of the late-1970s surge in inflation.7 In this instance, the government abandoned attempts to patch up the system and instead undertook sweeping deregulation. Reg Q was phased out during the 1980s; state usury laws capping mortgage rates were abolished; restrictions on interstate banking were lifted by the mid-1990s; and lenders were permitted to offer adjustable-rate mortgages as well as mortgages that did not fully amortize and which therefore involved balloon payments at the end of the loan period. Critically, the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s ended the dominance of deposit-taking portfolio lenders in the mortgage market. By the 1990s, increased reliance on securitization led to a greater separation between mortgage lending and mortgage investing even as the mortgage and capital markets became more closely integrated. About 56 percent of the home mortgage market is now securitized, compared with only 10 percent in 1980 and less than 1 percent in 1970. In some ways, the new mortgage market came to look more like a textbook financial market, with fewer institutional "frictions" to impede trading and pricing of event-contingent securities. Securitization and the development of deep and liquid derivatives markets eased the spreading and trading of risk. New types of mortgage products were created. Recent developments notwithstanding, mortgages became more liquid instruments, for both lenders and borrowers. Technological advances facilitated these changes; for example, computerization and innovations such as credit scores reduced the costs of making loans and led to a "commoditization" of mortgages. Access to mortgage credit also widened; notably, loans to subprime borrowers accounted for about 13 percent of outstanding mortgages in 2006. I suggested that the mortgage market has become more like the frictionless financial market of the textbook, with fewer institutional or regulatory barriers to efficient operation. In one important respect, however, that characterization is not entirely accurate. A key function of efficient capital markets is to overcome problems of information and incentives in the extension of credit. The traditional model of mortgage markets, based on portfolio lending, solved these problems in a straightforward way: Because banks and thrifts kept the loans they made on their own books, they had strong incentives to underwrite carefully and to invest in gathering information about borrowers and communities. In contrast, when most loans are securitized and originators have little financial or reputational capital at risk, the danger exists that the originators of loans will be less diligent. In securitization markets, therefore, monitoring the originators and ensuring that they have incentives to make good loans is critical. I have argued elsewhere that, in some cases, the failure of investors to provide adequate oversight of originators and to ensure that originators' incentives were properly aligned was a major cause of the problems that we see today in the subprime mortgage market (Bernanke, 2007). In recent months we have seen a reassessment of the problems of maintaining adequate monitoring and incentives in the lending process, with investors insisting on tighter underwriting standards and some large lenders pulling back from the use of brokers and other agents. We will not return to the days in which all mortgage lending was portfolio lending, but clearly the originate-to-distribute model will be modified--is already being modified--to provide stronger protection for investors and better incentives for originators to underwrite prudently. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Since the Mid-1980s The dramatic changes in mortgage finance that I have described appear to have significantly affected the role of housing in the monetary transmission mechanism. Importantly, the easing of some traditional institutional and regulatory frictions seems to have reduced the sensitivity of residential construction to monetary policy, so that housing is no longer so central to monetary transmission as it was.8 In particular, in the absence of Reg Q ceilings on deposit rates and with a much-reduced role for deposits as a source of housing finance, the availability of mortgage credit today is generally less dependent on conditions in short-term money markets, where the central bank operates most directly. Most estimates suggest that, because of the reduced sensitivity of housing to short-term interest rates, the response of the economy to a given change in the federal funds rate is modestly smaller and more balanced across sectors than in the past.9 These results are embodied in the Federal Reserve's large econometric model of the economy, which implies that only about 14 percent of the overall response of output to monetary policy is now attributable to movements in residential investment, in contrast to the model's estimate of 25 percent or so under what I have called the New Deal system. The econometric findings seem consistent with the reduced synchronization of the housing cycle and the business cycle during the present decade. In all but one recession during the period from 1960 to 1999, declines in residential investment accounted for at least 40 percent of the decline in overall real GDP, and the sole exception--the 1970 recession--was preceded by a substantial decline in housing activity before the official start of the downturn. In contrast, residential investment boosted overall real GDP growth during the 2001 recession. More recently, the sharp slowdown in housing has been accompanied, at least thus far, by relatively good performance in other sectors. That said, the current episode demonstrates that pronounced housing cycles are not a thing of the past. My discussion so far has focused primarily on the role of variations in housing finance and residential construction in monetary transmission. But, of course, housing may have indirect effects on economic activity, most notably by influencing consumer spending. With regard to household consumption, perhaps the most significant effect of recent developments in mortgage finance is that home equity, which was once a highly illiquid asset, has become instead quite liquid, the result of the development of home equity lines of credit and the relatively low cost of cash-out refinancing. Economic theory suggests that the greater liquidity of home equity should allow households to better smooth consumption over time. This smoothing in turn should reduce the dependence of their spending on current income, which, by limiting the power of conventional multiplier effects, should tend to increase macroeconomic stability and reduce the effects of a given change in the short-term interest rate. These inferences are supported by some empirical evidence.10 On the other hand, the increased liquidity of home equity may lead consumer spending to respond more than in past years to changes in the values of their homes; some evidence does suggest that the correlation of consumption and house prices is higher in countries, like the United States, that have more sophisticated mortgage markets (Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2007). Whether the development of home equity loans and easier mortgage refinancing has increased the magnitude of the real estate wealth effect--and if so, by how much--is a much-debated question that I will leave to another occasion. Conclusion I hope this exploration of the history of housing finance has persuaded you that institutional factors can matter quite a bit in determining the influence of monetary policy on housing and the role of housing in the business cycle. Certainly, recent developments have added yet further evidence in support of that proposition. The interaction of housing, housing finance, and economic activity has for years been of central importance for understanding the behavior of the economy, and it will continue to be central to our thinking as we try to anticipate economic and financial developments. In closing, I would like to express my particular appreciation for an individual who I count as a friend, as I know many of you do: Edward Gramlich. Ned was scheduled to be on the program but his illness prevented him from making the trip. As many of you know, Ned has been a research leader in the topics we are discussing this weekend, and he has just finished a very interesting book on subprime mortgage markets. We will miss not only Ned's insights over the course of this conference but his warmth and wit as well. Ned and his wife Ruth will be in the thoughts of all of us. Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke At the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming August 31, 2007
